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The civilisation of the *Märchen* is the period of matriarchy. The man marries into the wife's family; the mother goddess is still of great influence; the *Hexe* is by no means the ugly hag of the Middle Ages, but rather the wise woman, the queen. To conquer a kingdom in those days one had simply to kill the king and marry the queen, or if it was done in a more peaceful way, one married the daughter of a king. In the Norse tale *De syv Folerne* the king says to Ashlad, his son-in-law:

"You have got half the kingdom, and the other half you shall have on my death; for my sons can win land and kingdoms for themselves, now they are again princes."

Professor Pearson asks:

"And what became of *Märchenland*? It faded away before a world of grammar, history, and geography, a hundred times more idle and unreal than itself."

Our author concludes his study with these words:

"As we read fairy stories to our children, we may study history ourselves. No longer oppressed with the unreal and the *baroque*, we may see primitive human customs, and the life of primitive man and woman, cropping out in almost every sentence of the nursery tale. Written history tells us little of these things, they must be learnt, so to speak, from the mouths of babes. But there they are in the *Märchen* as invaluable fossils for those who will stoop to pick them up and study them. Back in the far past we can build up the life of our ancestry—the little kingdoms, the queen or her daughter as king-maker, the simple life of the royal household, and the humble candidate for the kingship, the priestess with her control of the weather, and her power over youth and maid. In the dimmest distance we see traces of the earlier kindred group-marriage, and in the nearer foreground the beginnings of that fight with patriarchal institutions which led the priestess to be branded by the new Christian civilisation as the evil-working witch of the Middle Ages. All this and something more may be learnt by the elder, while little eyes sparkle and little cheeks grow warm over the success which attends kindly, simple Ashiepatle in the search for his luck." κ.

BUDDHISM AND ITS CHRISTIAN CRITICS. By *Dr. Paul Carus*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1897. Pages, 316. Price, \$1.25.

The main difficulty, perhaps, about Buddhism is the apparent contradiction involved in its teaching that there is no soul and yet preaching morals, the purification of the soul, and its immortality. Almost all criticisms of Buddhism either denounce the system as inconsistent, or condemn it as atheism and nihilism. It is these problems which all who study Buddhism will encounter, and almost all who have failed to grasp its significance have stumbled here. The fact is that Buddhism is a religion which possesses a definite philosophy, and its main problem centres in psychology. All the other religions are different in this respect. They are exclusively practical, and committed to no special philosophy. Their founders used cer-

tain religious terms and left it to the development of the churches to work out a metaphysical foundation. Christian philosophies, such as those of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, propounded doctrines that were very antagonistic among themselves, and yet they might all be considered as good Christian philosophies. Mohammedan philosophers, especially in Spain, were allowed great liberty of thought, and doubtless, too, interpreted their religion in various ways. Buddhism is different in that it permits great freedom in the development of rituals and has actually produced the most complicated and fantastic ceremonies with strong local coloring both in the south and in the north, in Siam and in China, while its underlying philosophy remained the same. But being a philosophy which requires abstract thinking, we must not expect that every parish priest should be acquainted with it, let alone understand it, and the main difficulty to Buddhists themselves is this apparent contradiction, that in one respect they teach unequivocally the non-existence of the soul, and in other respects as unequivocally urge the necessity of salvation for the life to come.

The present book enters in a general way into this main difficulty and throws light upon more than one side. Buddhism rejects all those features of Brahmanism which by Brahmans were deemed to be the essential features of religion, viz., the divine inspiration of the Vedas, the helpfulness of prayer, and the meritoriousness of sacrifices. Buddha replaces the first by independent investigation. "Be ye lamps unto yourselves," he says to his disciples, even in his dying hour. The second, viz., "prayers," he replaces by "vows." For the third, Buddhism has substituted flower offerings at Buddha's shrines. But the emphasis of a religious life is placed on walking in the noble eightfold path of righteousness. The Samkhya philosophy from which Buddhism took its start is a dualism. It regards matter as the cause of all pain, and seeks salvation in the riddance of the soul from the body. Buddha retained many of the formulas of the Samkhya philosophy, but he denied the existence of the soul as an essence, and saw in it a mere compound of activities. But here lies the difficulty. These activities are not nonentities, but though they are not substances they are yet in their peculiar character the most important realities of life. There is nothing in the world that a man can call his own, neither fortune nor power, nor even personal relations, wife, and children, and friends, except his deeds. They are he himself. He inherits them by his ancestors, and he transmits them to the world when he departs. Thus, that which constitutes his being existed before him and will exist after him. He is the continuity of certain activities in a new combination, and these activities continue in new combinations after his death.

It is perhaps difficult to understand the reality of such an existence which is unsubstantial, but any one trained in abstract thinking will not fail to grasp its significance. Similar propositions occurred again and again in the world of science and were denounced for similar reasons as destructive and nihilistic. For instance, in physics the idea prevailed that fire was a certain substance which was called

fire-stuff or phlogiston. When some advanced physicists came to the conclusion that phlogiston did not exist, they were first ridiculed for daring to overthrow the orthodox conception of fire, and were suspected of maintaining that fire was a non-entity. The same process again occurred when in physiology the time-honored "vital force" was denied to have any substantial existence. The old vitalist school once occupied the field alone, but any one who would not believe in a vital force was regarded as ignorant and impervious to the most obvious truths of physiology. Vitalism as an independent force in animated substances was regarded so much as a matter of direct experience that it took almost half a century for the new physiology to overcome this time-honored superstition. At present the old vitalism is entirely overthrown, and the only defendant of it, Professor Bunge, practically defends only the advisability of retaining the name which he, however, interprets in a new sense which as much denies the old vitalism as do the other physiologies. In this same sense Buddhism denies the existence of a soul-stuff in any form, be it as a soul-monad or as a soul-force, or as a kind of vital breath. It denies what the Brahmins call *âtman*, but it does not deny the reality of man's deeds, the reality of the importance of morality, the reality of the present life of man and its future continuance in this same life in which we now live. At the same time Buddhism employs symbols which practically are the same as the Christian symbols in representing the future life as the reappearance in a paradise. *Nirvâna* must not be confounded with the Christian heaven, for *Nirvâna* is realisable in this life as well as in any other life. *Nirvâna* is the attainment of salvation, not the enjoyment of heavenly bliss, and therefore the representations of *Nirvâna* and of the Western Paradise are very different in Buddhism.

The present book consists of six chapters. The first is an exposition of Buddhism, its origin from Brahmanism, and its connexion with the Brahman philosophies, especially the Samkhya school. The second chapter enters into philosophical questions, explaining the anti-metaphysical bent of Buddha's theory, the doctrine of the deathless, and of salvation as the attaining to the deathless. The third chapter is devoted to Buddhist psychology and to its denial of the *âtman*-soul. The concepts Karma and *Nirvâna* receive special treatment in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter compares Christianity and Buddhism, bringing out not only its contrasts but also its striking similarities, both in ethics and in innumerable details which have always suggested the idea of a common origin of the two religions. The last chapter is cast in the form of replies to those Christian critics of Buddhism who have misunderstood its doctrines, especially the doctrine of the soul and its nihilism. The author believes that comparison is indispensable for acquiring comprehension, and for this reason he would urge Christians to study Buddhism and Buddhists to study Christianity. He believes that Buddhists would be immeasurably benefited by studying Christianity as it really is, especially in Protestant countries, while the Christians have very great need of studying Buddhist philosophy, which

formulated for the first time in the history of religion the fundamental problem of the religious life. p.

MODERN MYTHOLOGY. By *Andrew Lang, M.A., LL.D.* St. Andrews, Honorary Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, Sometime Gifford Lecturer in the University of St. Andrews. New York, London, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897. Pages, 212.

The luminous and voluminous *Contributions* of Prof. F. Max Müller to the *Science of Mythology* which we noticed in Vol. VII., page 625 of *The Monist* have met their scientific retort courteous in the present little volume of Mr. Andrew Lang, the well-known English writer, inquirer and vulgariser of folklore, editor, littérateur, and high-priest of English literary criticism—Prof. Max Müller's favorite target in his strictures on the anthropological school of mythological inquiry.

To animadvert upon the method of exposition employed by these two controversialists is not our concern. We shall limit ourselves to saying that the method of exposition employed is not adapted to the needs of the general reader, but in both cases is that of isolated and disconnected discussions upon subjects with which the student must be antecedently familiar, which, though they offer no intrinsic difficulties to comprehension, yet require prior interest and some preparatory philological and ethnological knowledge. Furthermore, there is much in both volumes that is personal. Mr. Lang in taking up cudgels for the anthropological school has followed, he claims, Prof. Max Müller's system of attack, and hence his reply is, as he himself phrases it, highly "desultory and rambling." The contents of Mr. Lang's book are as follows: I. Recent Mythology; II. The Story of Daphne; III. The Question of Allies; IV. Mannhardt; V. Philology and Demeter Erinnys; VI. Totemism; VII. The Validity of Anthropological Evidence; VIII. The Philological Method in Anthropology; IX. Criticism of Fetishism; X. The Riddle Theory; XI. Artemis; XII. The Fire-Walk; XIII. The Origin of Death. Each of these chapters is broken up into subdivisions after the manner of his opponent's book, and headed by bold-faced type—happily designed for the guidance of the reader through a chaotic maze of disordered argumentations. This, in conjunction with the excellent index, offsets the many disadvantages of the book and enhances its value for occasional consultation; for it really abounds in bright, witty, and pertinent remarks, notable both for their common sense and scientific insight.

Be the result of the controversy what it may, and opinion in these days seems to lean towards the anthropological school, the sweet and assuring remark of Mr. Lang at the conclusion of his volume still remains irrevocably true.

"If I am right, if he [Prof. Max Müller] is wrong, in our attempts to untie "this old Gordian knot, he loses little indeed. That fame of his, the most steady "and brilliant light of all which crown the brows of contemporary scholars, is the "well-earned reward, not of mythological lore nor of cunning fence in controversy "but of wide learning and exquisitely luminous style."